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Contrary to perspectives that credit Jirms with only limited 
abilities to undertake significant change successfully, recent research 
has demonstrated that firms often improve their performance after 
undertaking major expansion to their operations. In this paper, we 
build on a study by Mitchell and Singh (1993) to test for differences 
in expansion effects, depending on whether the new goods substitute 
for old products and whether the firm is a generalist or specialist 
participant in the industry. The analysis helps us understand when a 
business can undertake major change successfully. The results have 
implications for ecological and other definitions of the core of a 
business and highlight the necessity for firms to undertake changes 
even at considerable risk to their existing operations. 
How readily should firms undertake major expansion to their core businesses? 
And what impact does such expansion have on their existing core activity? 
Several ecological studies (e.g., Hannan & Freeman 1977, 1984, 1989; Miner, 
Amburgey & Stearns, 1989) offer extensive argument and evidence that major 
organisational changes often result in reduced organisational performance. Other 
studies have found little impact of major change (e.g, Singh, House & Tucker, 
1986; Kelly & Amburgey, 1989; Delacroix & Swaminathan, 1991; Zajac & 
Shortell, 1989), however, while some researchers have found that major changes 
are sometimes converted into successful growth or result in longer business 
survival (Haveman, 1992; Mitchell & Singh, 1993). It is clear, therefore, that 
organisational change per se is not necessarily harmful. Rather, the impact varies 
by the nature of the change undertaken and by the depth of resources possessed 
by organisations. Therefore, identifying conditions that differentiate between 
positive and negative influences of expansion is an important research goal. 
In this paper, we attempt to identify product and firm-type conditions 
under which organisational change can be beneficial to organisations. We build 
on Mitchell and Singh (1993) to address how expansion or non-expansion into 
new technical subfields within an industry affects market share and survival 
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performance in the firms’ established businesses. While the earlier study 
controlled effects of firms’ market and organisational strength on the success 
of expansion, the analysis did not evaluate the impact of new good 
substitutability and firms’ existing product scope. Yet these factors are central 
issues in defining a firm’s business and its capabilities and can be expected to 
influence the success with which firms undertake major expansion. We argue 
that cases in which new goods substitute for existing products will have different 
effects on expansion success than cases when the new goods are neutral with 
respect to the old. We also predict that firms offering several product lines, which 
we refer to as generalists, will experience different effects from expansion than 
specialist incumbents that only offer a single product line. We present several 
hypotheses and research questions concerning the interaction between these 
product-types and firm-types. In the analyses, we control for differences in firms’ 
initial strength, which may influence their ability to undertake expansion. We 
test our predictions on the Mitchell and Singh (1993) data, the population of 
incumbents of the American market for medical diagnostic imaging equipment 
over a 35 year period. 
Spillback Effects On Established Businesses 
Industry incumbents face competing risks as new markets or technical 
subfields emerge. Failure to expand into these new fields may be perilous, 
depriving firms of the technical or market know-how and increased resource 
flows that may be required for continued success in a traditional business 
(Mitchell, 1989). Moreover, successful expansion into new fields within the 
industry can have many salutary effects on current operations (Mitchell & 
Singh, 1993) or overall firm performance (Haveman, 1992). On the other hand, 
expansion into new parts of the industry may disrupt successful routines in an 
existing business, strain available resources, cause the organisation to loose its 
focus, and lead to business failure (Cyert & March, 1963; Hannan & Freeman, 
1977, 1984; Nelson & Winter, 1982). 
We refer to the benefits that a firm enjoys in its base business as a result 
of undertaking an expansion into a new business as spillback benefits. Such 
benefits include economies of scale (Porter, 1980), scope (Teece, 1980) and 
learning (Amit, 1986). Product improvement opportunities resulting from 
serendipitous or designed improvements in R&D (Nelson, 1959) and 
manufacturing capability (Wheelwright, 1985) for the new products often 
provide useful capabilities that benefit existing products. In addition, expansion 
into new subfields may provide organisational and financial advantages in the 
base operations through competition-induced improvements in efficiency 
(Leibenstein, 1966; Shelton, 1967). Enhancements made to structure and control 
systems to accommodate the expansion may benefit existing product lines. 
The positive effects of expansion are likely to be strongest in the context 
of low-transilience innovation (Abernathy & Clark, 1985) that is, innovation 
involving significant changes to the technology of core products but only 
incremental change to supporting assets such as reputations and distribution 
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systems. Firms undertaking low-transilience expansion can build on their stock 
of supporting assets and are likely to face fewer resource and knowledge 
constraints in their new ventures (Teece, 1986). In addition, improvements and 
extensions of supporting assets needed for participation in the new product area 
will often be useful or necessary for the base business. The strains on existing 
activities are also likely to be less following low-transilience expansion, as 
organisations will usually need to make relatively few changes to supporting 
routines and activities (Romanelli & Tushman, 1991). Such changes include 
developing or acquiring new technologies, new markets, new distribution 
channels, new resources, and new internal structures and procedures. Hence, 
expansion in low-transilience cases will often produce large benefits at relatively 
low cost. 
Nonetheless, expansion also may create spillback disadvantages, even in 
low-transilience cases. Failure of a new business may cause managerial or 
financial problems for an existing business. Successful expansion may result 
in sales cannibalisation, organisational and market confusion, and diversion 
of material and managerial resources. The established businesses of expanding 
firms will sometimes suffer, therefore, while nonexpanding firms may continue 
to perform well (Cooper & Schendel, 1976). 
In the following sections, we discuss and analyze differences in products 
and firms that may lead to different business performance following expansion. 
We use several terms throughout the discussion. We define an industry as a 
group of firms that manufacture goods having “reasonable interchangeability 
of use or cross elasticity of demand” (U.S. Supreme Court, 1964, p. 76). A 
technical subfield of an industry (Mitchell, 1989) is a set of products that draw 
on a distinct knowledge base (Nelson & Winter, 1982; Dosi, 1988). By 
incumbent, we mean a firm participating in the industry when a new technical 
subfield emerges. We refer to the subfield in which an incumbent operated when 
the new subfield emerged as its base subfield (or subfields) and its operations 
in the base subfield as its base business. We refer to the market share attained 
in its base subfield by an incumbent after the emergence of a new subfield as 
subsequent market share. A substitute subfield is a new subfield in which 
products tend to substitute for goods in an established subfield, while a neutral 
subfield is a new subfield in which products do not substitute substantially for 
goods in an established subfield.’ We define specialists as firms that operate 
in only one technical subfield of an industry and generalists as firms that 
participate in more than one technical subfield of that industry. 
Two key conditions frame this research. First, we focus on low-transilience 
innovation. Second, we address cases in which established goods continue to 
be sold even after new technology is introduced. Both conditions are found in 
the medical diagnostic imaging industry and in many other cases of industry 
evolution.2 
Substitute Versus Neutral Products 
Most new goods introduced into an industry will at least partially substitute 
for established products, but some goods will substitute more directly than 
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others. Mitchell (1989) found that industry incumbents are more likely to 
expand into a new subfield if the new products directly replace existing products. 
If a new product completely dominates the old, so that sales of the old good 
are almost eliminated, a firm that expands into the new subfield is likely to 
exit from the base subfield. When sales of the old products continue, although 
perhaps at a reduced rate, there may be spillback benefits of expansion into 
the substitute subfield that improve performance in the base subfield, These 
benefits may be gained from reputational spillback, increased understanding 
of customer demands, volume economies, and other supporting asset symmetry 
between the subfields. 
An alternate hypothesis regarding expansion into substitute products is 
that sales cannibalisation and organisational limitations will lead to reduced 
performance of expanding firms rather than increased market share and longer 
survival in the base subfield, even when sales of the old products continue 
(Reinganum, 1983). However, we expect that the alternate logic will not apply 
when the established products continue to be sold at a significant level. Instead, 
continued base subfield sales in low-transilience conditions will enable firms 
that participate in the new subfield to spill benefits back into the older business. 
Although expansion into neutral subfields may create some technical or 
production benefits, spillback benefits stemming from reputational, product, 
and market complementarity are likely to be less than for substitute products. 
Consequently, we expect expansion into neutral subfields to offer fewer benefits 
for performance in the base subfield relative to expansion into substitute 
subfields. 
Proposition 1 a. Incumbents expanding into substitute subfields will 
tend to prosper in their base businesses, while incumbents expanding 
into neutral subfields will gain few advantages. 
Failure to expand into a substitute subfield will clearly be detrimental to 
firms when the substitute product eliminates sales in the base subfield. However, 
failure to expand even when base subfield sales continue at a significant level 
can harm performance by depriving firms of new technological and 
organisational skills and potential resource inflows. The benefits forgone are 
likely to be relatively few for neutral products, because these products have few 
product-market simiiarities with existing product lines. Consequently, failure to 
expand is likely to retard performance more for substitute than neutral products. 
Proposition lb. Incumbents that do not expand into substitute 
subfields will tend to suffer in their base businesses, while incumbents 
that do not expand into neutral subfieIds will realise few 
disadvantages. 
Specialist Versus Generalist Firms 
We expect specialist and generalist firms to face different expansion- 
nonexpansion tradeoffs. Compared to specialists, generalists are likely to have 
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more industry-related slack and greater industry-related resources with which 
to support existing and new operations (Hannan & Freeman, 1977). Generalists 
are also likely to possess more organisational skills for expanding, having 
previously undertaken this process (Mitchell & Singh, 1993). Specialists on the 
other hand, will need to develop new organisational skills even while expanding. 
Therefore, the stress created by expansion may be felt more strongly throughout 
the base business of a specialist. 
We expect this stress to be felt whether a specialist is a one-industry single- 
product company or a multi-industry firm with operations in a single technical 
subfield of the expanding industry. Single-product firms will have few 
extraneous resources, while diversified companies will have few industry-related 
resources or experience to draw from if problems arise during expansion. The 
multi-industry diversified firm also may face problems of low corporate 
commitment and may simply divest if the expansion runs into unexpected 
problems. 
As well as different expansion benefits and threats, specialists and 
generalists may face different threats if they do not expand. Generalist success 
typically stems from offering a broad range of products and a generalist firm 
risks reducing or losing reputational, distribution, and other advantages if it 
does not expand. In contrast, specialist success flows from focusing on a single 
set of products, so that the effects of not expanding into a new subfield are 
likely to be less severe if products in its focal subfield continue to be sold.3 
Proposition 2a. Expanding generalists will tend to prosper in their 
base businesses, while expanding specialists will suffer. 
Proposition 2b. Generalists that do not expand will tend to suffer 
in their base businesses, while specialists that do not expand will realise 
few disadvantages. 
Product- Type And Firm- Type Interactions 
We expect to find significant interactions between product-types and firm- 
types. Expansion by a generalist into a substitute product area, for instance, 
may have different spillback effects from expansion by a specialist into the same 
product area. We will consider the eight possible three-way interactive categories 
that arise from our expansion-nonexpansion, substitute-neutral, and generalist- 
specialist classifications. Some interactive effects will be derived as hypotheses, 
while others will be presented as empirical research questions. 
First, let us consider expansion by a generalist incumbent into a substitute 
subfield. Because Propositions la and 2a predict that expansion into substitute 
subfields and expansion by generalist firms both will lead to spillback benefits, 
we predict that the three-way interaction will be positive. Drawing from 
Propositions lb and 2b, we also predict that the effect of nonexpansion in 
such cases will be negative, owing to the lost technical and market 
opportunities. 
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Hla. Generalists that expand into substitute subfields will achieve 
better performance in their base businesses. 
Hlb. Generalists that do not expand into substitute subfields will 
suffer poorer performance in their base businesses. 
Second, we take up the case of expansion by a generalist incumbent into 
a neutral subfield. Propositions 2a and 2b expect generalist expansion to be 
positive and non-expansion to be negative, while proposition la holds that 
expansion in the neutral case will provide few benefits. This implies that the 
combined effect for generalists is likely to be positive for expansion and negative 
for nonexpansion. The impact of the generalist-neutral combinations may be 
weaker than the generalist-substitute case, but we will leave that issue for 
empirical investigation. Propositions 2b and lb produce a complementary 
nonexpansion hypothesis concerning generalists and neutral subfields. 
H2a. Generalists that expand into neutral subfields will achieve 
better performance in their base businesses. 
H2b. Generalists that do not expand into neutral subfields will 
achieve poorer performance in their base businesses. 
Third, consider expansion by a specialist incumbent into a substitute 
subfield. Proposition la expects substitute expansion to be positive, but 
Proposition 2a predicts that the specialist expansion will be negative. The two 
effects may moderate each other, but our initial estimate is that the positive 
influence of expansion may dominate. If so, then the combined effect of 
expansion, product-type, and firm-type will be positive and the effect of 
nonexpansion in the same combination will be negative. We base this estimate 
on two factors. First, Mitchell and Singh (1993) identified strong positive 
spillbacks of expansion. Second, this paper examines specialist expansion 
between subfields within an industry, for which we expect negative spillback 
to be less than for cases in which expansion takes place across industries. 
Propositions lb and 2b again produce a complementary nonexpansion 
hypothesis. Given the tradeoffs involved in specialist-substitute expansion, we 
expect this effect to be weaker than in the generalist-substitute case; we 
investigate this as an empirical question. 
H3a. Specialists that expand into substitute subfields will achieve 
better performance in their base businesses. 
H3b. Specialists that do not expand into substitute subfields will 
achieve poorer performance in their base businesses. 
The final issue concerns expansion by specialist incumbents into neutral 
subfields. We predicted above that expansion by specialists and expansion into 
neutral subfields would generate few spillback benefits, because there are 
relatively few reputational, product, and market benefits that a specialist firm 
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could gain from entering a subfield that does not substitute for its existing 
activities. We can raise no strong prior case for how the advantages and 
disadvantages of expansion will trade-off against the limited benefits gained 
from a specialist’s expansion into a neutral subfield. Therefore, we present the 
effects of the expansion and nonexpansion for the combination of specialist 
firms and neutral subfields as research questions. 
Research question la. Will specialists that expand into neutral 
subfields realise differential performance in their base businesses? 
Research question lb. Will specialists that do not expand into 




We examine the performance of firms operating in four base subfields of 
the medical diagnostic imaging industry between 1953 and 1989. The study 
period commences one year before the emergence of the second technical 
subfield of the industry (nuclear medicine in 1954) to allow the identification 
of incumbent firms in the industry, and covers the emergence of all new technical 
subfields in the industry. This industry consists of firms that manufacture 
equipment used by physicians and other health care workers to nonintrusively 
examine organs and physiological activity within live beings. Table 1 lists new 
technical subfields of the imaging industry that have emerged since the early 
1950s to substitute for and complement earlier x-ray imaging products. Despite 
the introduction of the new products, sales of the established devices in the base 
subfields continue to be significant, as shown in Figure 1. 
In defining the sample and collecting data, we omitted component 
suppliers, treated the U.S. market as the geographic limit, used calendar years 
as the measure of participation, and dated expansion as the year in which a 
firm began to manufacture imaging systems in the new subfield. All firms 
manufactured equipment for the human medical diagnostic field. We conducted 
the analysis at the parent-firm level for the industry, owing both to difficulty 
in assigning organisational subunit level exit dates and to the presence of 
Table 1. Diagnostic Imaging Technical Subfields 
Subfield U.S. Introduction 
Conventional x-ray imaging 1896 
Nuclear medicine 1954 
Ultrasound 1957 
Computed tomography 1973 
Magnetic resonance imaging 1980 
Digital radiography 1981 
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potential parent-level influences on strategy and performance. We distinguished 
between base subfield exit by acquisition and exit by dissolution, which have 
been found to reflect differing organisational and strategic influences (Freeman, 
Carroll & Hannan, 1983). 
The data were gathered from an extensive archival search of academic, 
industry, and government sources, supplemented by interviews with industry 
and academic participants. The sample includes all firms participating in the 
x-ray, nuclear, ultrasound, CT, and magnetic resonance subfields when new 
subfields emerged.4 In using a data set comprising all firm in the industry, which 
includes firms that did not expand into the new subfields, we avoid the bias 
that would have resulted from only analyzing the performance of firms that 
actually expanded. Comparison of 14 base subfield-new subfield pairs produced 
371 base subfield incumbents, 100 of which expanded into emerging subfields. 
By the end of the study, 187 incumbents had exited from the base subfields 
(81 by acquisition and 106 by dissolution). Analyses were carried out for the 
full pool of 371 incumbents. We checked for bias introduced by the pooling 
(Tuma & Hannan, 1984), finding no qualitative differences. 
Variables 
Dependent variables. We employ two measures or performance, 
continued participation and subsequent market share, because previous 
research has demonstrated that financial and market share performance are 
often affected differently from survival measures (Mitchell, 1991; Haveman 
1992; Mitchell & Singh, 1993). Continued participation was measured as the 
number of years that a firm continued to participate in the base business after 
the emergence of a new subfield.’ For example, the survival of each firm 
participating in the x-ray or nuclear base subfield during 1956 (the year before 
the commercial introduction of diagnostic ultrasound equipment) was clocked 
until its exit from its base subfield. A O-l right-censor dummy variable identified 
firms participating at the end of the study. In the analysis of exit by acquisition 
and dissolution, we treated each type as a censored case in the analysis of the 
other (Freeman et al., 1983), thus allowing decomposition of the sample while 
maximising use of the data. When we examined influences on the length of 
participation before exit by dissolution we recorded firms that exited by 
acquisition as censored cases, for example, just as we recorded firms that 
continued to participate at the end of the study as censored cases. 
The market share variables were arbitrarily defined as the market share 
in the base business held by an incumbent during years 4, 8, and 16 after the 
emergence of a new subfield. The 4 and 8 year measures apply to all base and 
emerging subfields; the 16 year market share measure does not apply to base 
subfield performance following emergence of the magnetic resonance and digital 
radiography subfields, which have not reached 16 years of existence. Only firms 
that survived at least 5, 9, and 17 years were included in the market share 
analyses. 
Expansion variables. We used the following eight combinations of three- 
way interactions between the firms’ actions (expansion or nonexpansion), firm 
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types (generalist or specialist) and product types (substitute or neutral), which 





































We used the combinations to calculate eight dummy variables. For 
example, we defined one dummy variable to identify generalists firms that 
expanded into substitute subfields (Hla). Similarly, another dummy variable 
identified generalists expanding into neutral subfields (H2a). We then employed 
mean effects coding to estimate comparisons against the overall average effect.6 
We assigned firm type and product type status based on the following 
reasoning. We judged substitution to be significant for the CT new subfield 
with respect to the x-ray and nuclear base sublields, and for the magnetic 
resonance and digital radiography new subfields with respect to the x-ray and 
CT base subfields (Mitchell, 1989). As noted earlier, we defined a firm that 
participated in only one subfield within the diagnostic imaging industry when 
a new subfield emerged as a specialist, and an incumbent of more than one 
subfield as a generalist. 
Control variables. We defined several control variables at the firm and 
subfield levels. These included: (1) prior industry market share; and (2) prior 
base subfield market share, measured during the year before the emergence of 
a new subfield; (3) firm size, measured as the log value of corporate sales deflated 
by the Producer Price Index (1967=1); (4) a missing size indicator variable, for 
cases in which size was estimated; (5) a U.S. majority ownership dummy variable, 
to control for the advantages that American firms may enjoy in the U.S. market 
and for systematic differences that have been found between U.S. and foreign 
firms in this industry (Mitchell & Singh 1993); (6) a variable that recorded the 
introduction year of the relevant new subfield; and (7) a set of four mean effects 
base subfield dummy variables.’ The first three variables, prior industry market 
share, prior base subfield market share, and firm size, all measure the strength 
of firms prior to the expansion decision. Collectively, they control for effects 
that such strength may have on firms’ propensity to undertake expansion. 
Statistical Methods 
We used accelerated event-time regression (Kalbfleisch & Prentice, 1980; 
Cox & Oakes, 1984) to estimate the effects of expansion on survival performance 
and conventional maximum-likelihood regression to examine the market share 
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effects. We specified log-linear accelerated event-time models, selecting the 
logistic distribution as the baseline parametric assumption, on the basis of best 
data fit.8 Using the accelerated event-time method in this case permits us to 
incorporate the information that the length of continued participation for some 
firms was right-censored (Mitchell, 1991), that is, they had not exited the base 
subfield by the end of the study. With the conventional regression market share 
models, we specified linear normally-distributed models. All models were 
estimated with maximum likelihood procedures of the PROC LIFEREG 
procedure of SAS (SAS Institute, Inc., 1985). 
Results 
Table 2 displays the results of the tests. We first discuss the effects on the 
length of continued participation and next examine influences on market share. 
We then briefly review the firm-level and subfield-level control effects. 
As predicted, most expansion effects on the length of participation were 
positive, while most nonexpansion effects were negative (column 1). As we 
expected, expansion by generalists into substitute subfields is somewhat more 
positive than other generalist and specialist expansion effects. The converse does 
not hold, however, as nonexpansion in generalist-substitute cases is no more 
negative than all but specialist-substitute nonexpansion. In the specialist-neutral 
case, which was the subject of Research Questions la and lb, it appears that 
the positive effects of expansion and negative effects of nonexpansion 
overwhelm any differential product-type and firm-type effects. 
Similar results are obtained when the acquisition and dissolution exits are 
analyzed separately. Nonexpansion is usually associated with shorter survival 
for both acquisition and dissolution (columns 2 and 3), as it was for all exits. 
The expansion-acquisition results in column 2 also are generally consistent with 
the magnitude of the influences on all exits, although the significance varies 
somewhat and the positive generalist expansion effect grows substantially.g 
Although the acquisition influences are similar to the all-exit case, the 
expansion-dissolution results in column 3 differ strikingly. Expansion has no 
significant effect on generalists that shut down, whether they expand into 
substitute or neutral subfields. It is likely that generalists are better able to 
tolerate the poor performance of any particular subfield, and that they cease 
operations because of weakness in all their businesses rather than because of 
shortcomings in any single area of operation. Therefore, the negative effects 
of any single expansion are likely to be less severe for generalists. For specialists, 
meanwhile, the positive effect of expansion into neutral subfields becomes 
substantially stronger for dissolution exits. It appears that specialists may 
sometimes stave off dissolution of a problem business by expanding into a new, 
neutral subfield. Consistent with intuition, expansion into a substitute business 
does not offer the specialist firm a similar benefit. 
In the market share analyses (columns 4-6), the nonexpansion influences 
tend to take the predicted negative direction, although the effects become more 
variable in the longer-term eight and 16 year estimates. There are few significant 
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differences among firm-types and product-types in the nonexpansion cases. As 
expected, though, nonexpansion by specialists into neutral product areas is 
consistently less harmful than most other nonexpansion cases. Similarly, 
nonexpansion by generalists into neutral product areas has, at most, weakly 
negative or no significant influence on subsequent market share. 
The effects of expansion on subsequent market share are more varied. As 
expected, generalists that expand into substitute product areas receive the 
greatest benefit in their base businesses, although the benefit disappears by year 
16. Specialists that expand into substitute subfields, meanwhile, tend to fare 
relatively poorly in their base businesses. Specialists that expand into neutral 
subfields, though, receive strong spillback benefits. It is probable that substitute 
expansion causes cannibalisation and confusion on the part of a specialist’s 
customers, while neutral expansion provides an opportunity to develop new 
market niches without disrupting established focused operations. 
In summary, we found most predicted influences of the interactions 
between expansion, product-type, and firm-type. Most survival and market 
share results supported Hypotheses la, lb, and 2b. Generalists that expand into 
substitute subfields do better than average. Generalists that do not expand, 
whether into substitute or neutral subfields, do worse than average. Consistent 
with Hypothesis 3b, specialists that do not expand into substitute subfields fare 
poorly. The results are more mixed for Hypotheses 2a and 3a, providing little 
consistent support for the propositions that expansion by generalists into 
neutral subfields and specialists into substitute subfields will lead to improved 
performance. Generally, our results strongly argue for the position that 
incumbents are better off facing the costs and risks of expansion than cautiously 
maintaining the status quo when a new industry subfield emerges. 
Among the control variables, only prior industry and subfield market share 
had consistent effects on subsequent market share. Both influences tended to 
be positive, with industry share having the greatest and longest lasting pressure. 
The most consistent influences on survival were prior market share, U.S. 
ownership, and new subfield introduction year. Mitchell and Singh (1993) 
predicted and found the negative influence of prior subfield market share. 
Consistent with other studies of this and other industries (e.g., Mitchell 1989), 
U.S. ownership had a negative impact on base subfield survival. The control 
influences on survival apply almost entirely to exit by dissolution, with few 
significant effects emerging in the acquisition model. 
Discussion 
This paper addresses the key issue in the study of organisational change, 
which is not whether change is good or bad, but when changes will be beneficial 
to an organization and when they will be more likely to harm its performance 
(Mitchell & Singh, 1993). As expected, spillback effects into a base business 
vary with the types of firms that expand and the types of new subfields into 
which they expand. The survival analyses supported most predictions, although 
the results apply most strongly to exit by acquisition and more weakly to 
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dissolution exits. We found most predicted nonexpansion effects on subsequent 
market share, although some expansion influences on market share were 
counter to those expected. 
Among the most interesting distinctions that arise from the analysis is the 
differential infhtence of the expansion strategy followed by specialist firms 
following the emergence of substitute and neutral subfields. Refer first to the 
specialist-substitute cases. Here, the differential effects of expansion and 
nonexpansion are small. Specialists that expand survive slightly longer than 
those that do not, at least before exiting by acquisition. Even specialists that 
survive receive only short-term relative market share benefits from expansion; 
only for year 4 market share is nonexpansion into a substitute subfield 
associated with significantly less market share than expansion. In general, a 
specialist is at risk following the emergence of a substitute subfield. Its market 
share tends to decline and its hopes for continued survival are, at best, average. 
Notice, though, that generalists do gain market share advantages through 
expansion into substitute subfields. At the same time, failure to expand into 
these subfields has negative effects on survival and subsequent market share, 
suggesting that generalist must offer products in new substitutes in order to 
maintain the breadth of their product lines. This may occur because their 
broader product scope leads to more joint purchases by a single buyer of 
products in several technical subfields. For instance, a hospital may decide to 
purchase CT scanners, x-ray equipment, and MRI instruments from a single 
buyer. 
Next note the effects on a specialist of an expansion strategy following 
the emergence of a neutral subfield. This environmental change presents both 
a threat and an opportunity for specialist firms. Specialists that do not expand 
fare poorly. They tend to have shorter continued participation and, at best, only 
maintain their relative market share. Specialists that expand into neutral 
subfields, meanwhile, may realise significant spillback benefits. They achieve 
moderately longer survival and strikingly greater market share in their base 
businesses. The market share benefits, indeed, appear to be even larger than 
those realised by generalists that expand into neutral subfields. This last result 
may imply that generalist status confers declining spillback benefits. The first 
successful expansion from a specialist core appears to provide substantial 
benefit to the base business; subsequent expansions provide lesser, but still 
positive, advantages. This result suggests that specialists can significantly 
improve their performance by fundamentally realigning their strategy to offer 
more general product lines, as long as these do not conflict with their base 
operations. Indeed, this expansion path may offer a route by which specialists 
can become successful generalists. 
These results are generally consistent with those obtained by Haveman 
(1992), who demonstrated that core changes are often beneficial to financial 
performance and survival. Haveman also found that expansions into related 
areas enhanced financial performance while changes into unrelated areas hurt 
performance. Our analysis of substitute and neutral subfields is generally similar 
to her employment of related and unrelated expansions, and provides 
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clarification of her results.” While expansion into substitute or related areas is 
beneficial, we find that expansion into neutral areas is sometimes equally 
beneficial. More importantly, failure to expand into new subfields can be so 
harmful to survival and market performance that irrespective of the degree of 
relatedness, or of firms’ basic strategy, expansion into these new subfields is 
almost mandatory. Ferguson and Morris (1993) make this point quite succinctly: 
The issue is not whether a company’s technology will be supplanted 
but by whom. Companies that resist internal cannibalization will die 
at the hands of outsiders. 
Finally, let us return to the issue that we raised in the opening discussion. 
Do these results suggest that firms should readily undertake changes to their 
core and do the results conflict with predictions that organisations changing 
their core activities will incur high risks of failure? A key central result of this 
study is that firms expanding into a new technical subfield tend to survive longer 
than those that do not expand. This suggests that not only can firms undertake 
major expansion to their core businesses, but also that they should expand under 
most circumstances when faced with new market opportunities. Even allowing 
for accompanying caveats, this result appears to contradict basic ecological 
predictions. 
But does introducing products in a new technical subfield of an industry 
represent changing the core structure of an incumbent’s organisation, even when 
the products themselves require new technology? In low-transilience cases, 
which is the context of this study, we suggest that expansion represents an 
extension of the core rather than a fundamental change of the core. During 
its early years in an industry, core products tend to represent a particularly 
significant component of a firm’s strategy (Hayes & Wheelwright, 1984; 
Schoonhoven, Eisenhardt & Lyman, 1990) and consequently help define core 
structure. As it gains experience in the industry, however, the assets that support 
development and commercialisation of products arguably become more 
important to the firm’s strategy and more integral parts of its resources and 
structure than any particular product. Specific products are less important to 
an industry incumbent than the possession of competencies that enable it to 
develop, sell, and service goods. An expanding firm in our study uses its 
established manufacturing routines to help commercialise a new product 
drawing on a new technical knowledge base and may require only adaptive 
change in its marketing function. Hannan and Freeman (1984, p. 156) identify 
stated goals, forms of authority, core technology and marketing strategy as the 
four elements that comprise an organisation’s core. Consequently, while 
significant, the form of expansion we study may require firms to change only 
one element of the organisational core. 
We suggest that the supporting routines are as much or more a part of 
the core of a firm as the specific products it sells or the markets its serves. In 
representing a stable set of patterns or competencies through which firms 
develop and commercialise their products, routines (Nelson & Winter, 1982) 
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are as central to organisations as the asset they own, the goods they produce 
and the personnel employ. Expansions that allow firms to continue to utilise 
existing routines while requiring firms to adopt new technologies may pose fewer 
organisational change challenges than often suspected. 
Associating products with the periphery of a business and supporting 
systems with its core may run counter to some intuition. However, it is generally 
recognised that replicating supporting systems is often more costly and difficult 
than imitating product innovations (e.g., Lippman & Rumelt, 1982; Teece, 1986; 
Mitchell, 1989). In such cases, it is the supporting systems that provide value 
and give a business its strength. This seems to us to be the essential nature of 
the core features of a business. Our argument is consistent with the notion that 
firms can be viewed as bundles of resources, routines and competencies, many 
of which are only indirectly related to the physical products marketed (Prahalad 
& Hamel, 1990; Barney, 1991). This argument is also consistent with the idea 
that firms tend to grow through expansion of core activities into new 
technological and market arenas (e.g., Penrose, 1959; Thompson, 1967; 
Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967; Meyer & Scott, 1983). 
Industry incumbents face significant strategic challenges when a new 
technical subfield of an industry emerges. Because many new products fail, 
many incumbents wait for the new products to prove themselves technically 
and in the market. If the new products succeed, most incumbents wishing to 
continue to participate in the industry must expand or risk exiting their base 
businesses. However, different types of products present different challenges to 
different types of firms. Broad-scope incumbents tend to face the greatest risks 
of nonexpansion. Single product-line firms, meanwhile, receive significant 
benefit from expansion into a neutral subfield but few benefits from expansion 
into a substitute subfield. On the other hand, failing to expand is almost 
uniformly detrimental. Resolving expansion issues requires understanding of 
the attributes of the new products, the uses to which their buyers put them, 
and the capabilities of the firms that might offer them. In sum, our findings 
clarify that the important question for firms is not how they can avoid or 
minimise the impact of change. Instead, the key issue is that firms have a limited 
choice when facing change: undertake the difficult process of expansion and 
possibly enjoy improved performance, or avoid expansion and face shorter 
survival. 
Acknowledgment: An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 
Administrative Sciences Association of Canada meetings in Niagara Falls, June 
1991. 
Notes 
1. We use the substitute-neutral distinction rather than the more traditional related-unrelated dichotomy, 
because our analysis examines low-transilience expansion. The core technology for all sublields in the 
medical diagnostic imaging industry was different, while supporting assets continued to be useful in 
all cases. Therefore the subfields were all related or all unrelated, depending on the measure of relatedness 
employed. Our classification provides variation on the firm-type categorisation. If relatedness is defined 
as the functions for which consumers utilise a product, which is a nontraditional but reasonable 
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definition, then our substitute sublields can be interpreted as related and the neutral sublields as 
unrelated. 
Despite representing relatively old technology, for example, dot matrix printers continue to be sold 
alongside newer printer technologies. Though laser, ink jet, and dot matrix printers all employ different 
core technologies, the same supporting assets can be used for all three product types. The consumer 
electronics, white good home appliance, and pharmaceutical industries are other relevant examples. 
As in the case of substitute and neutral products, an alternate logic may apply to the generalist-specialist 
distinction. It is possible that all firms, whether specialists or generalists, find it difficult to expand into 
new businesses and to realise potential spillback benefits. If so, the firm-type distinction may not 
differentiate between success in the base subfield. 
The last subfield to emerge was digital radiography in 1981, which thus contributed no incumbents 
to the analysis. 
Survival in the base business is a valid measure of performance in the medical diagnostic imaging 
industry, since all subfields have continued to exist with significant sales after the emergence of new 
subfields. Base subfield survival may be a less appropriate measure for industries in which these base 
subfields are eliminated or are reduced to marginal status after new subfields emerge. In these 
circumstances, persistence in base subfields may well reflect an inability to change, and thus, poorer 
performance. 
With mean effects coding, one starts with a set of O-l dummy variables. A single variable is then omitted 
and the value of the other variables is changed from 0 to -1 for cases in which the omitted variable 
is equal to I. The resulting analysis that uses the variables compares the effect of each variable to the 
overall mean effect, rather than to the effect of the omitted variable as is the result of the more common 
dummy variable procedure. The mean effects procedure can be repeated after omitting a different 
variable in order to obtain a value for the variable that was omitted in the first analysis. When values 
are obtained for all variables in the set, the coefficients sum to 0. Mean effects coding is appropriate 
when the theoretical interest in the variables concerns overall directions, rather than comparison to 
a single influence. 
Mitchell and Singh (1993) describe the variables, discuss expected influences, and provide summary 
statistics. 
The models look the form ln(T)=PX+t, where In(T) is the natural log of the length of participation 
T, X is a matrix of explanatory variables, b is an associated coefficient vector, and e is a parametrically 
distributed error term. 
Only the overall generalist expansion effect is reported in the acquisition model because estimates that 
distinguished between expansion into substitute and neutral subfields would not converge. 
Haveman (1992) studies the expansion of savings and loans institutions’ investments from traditional 
residential mortgages into new commercial and non-commercial investments. On the basis of similarity 
of products, consumers and technology, these expansions were classified as related or unrelated. The 
new activities, though different from existing operations, depended “. on established routines and 
competencies” (Haveman, 1992, p. 49) and amounted to low-transilience changes. Therefore, 
Haveman’s (1992) related-unrelated classification is comparable to our substitute-neutral classification. 
(See also footnote 1 above.) 
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